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Abstract
In this second part of our two-part paper, we invoke the stochastic maximum principle, conditional
Hamiltonian and the coupled backward-forward stochastic differential equations of the first part [1] to
derive team optimal decentralized strategies for distributed stochastic differential systems with noiseless
information structures. We present examples of such team games of nonlinear as well as linear quadratic
forms. In some cases we obtain closed form expressions of the optimal decentralized strategies.
Through the examples, we illustrate the effect of information signaling among the decision makers
in reducing the computational complexity of optimal decentralized decision strategies.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
In the first part [1] of this two part paper, we have derived team and person-by-person
optimality conditions for distributed stochastic differential systems with noiseless decentralized
information structures. Specifically, we considered distributed (coupled) stochastic differential
equations of Itoˆ form driven by Brownian motions, and decision makers acting on decentralized
noiseless i) nonanticipative and ii) feedback information structures, and we have shown existence
of team and person-by-person optimal strategies utilizing relaxed and regular strategies. Then
we applied tools from the classical theory of stochastic optimization with some variations to
derive team and person-by-person optimality conditions [2]–[5].
The first important concussions drawn from [1] is that the classical theory of stochastic opti-
mization is not limited in mathematical concepts and procedures by the centralized assumption
based upon which it is developed. It is directly applicable to differential systems consisting
of multiple decision makers, in which the acquisition of information and its processing is
decentralized or shared among several locations, while the decision makers actions are based on
different information structures. The second important conclusion drawn from [1] is that team
and person-by-person optimality conditions are given by a Hamiltonian system of equations
consisting of a conditional Hamiltonian, and coupled forward-backward stochastic differential
equations.
The work in [1] compliments the current body of knowledge on static team game theory
[6]–[10], and decentralized decision making [9]–[20], and more recent work in [21]–[26], by
introducing optimility conditions for general stochastic nonlinear differential systems.
The main remaining challenge is to determine whether under the formulation and assump-
tions introduced in [1], we can derive optimal decentralized strategies for nonlinear and linear
distributed stochastic differential systems, understand the computational complexity of these
strategies compared to centralized strategies, and determine how this complexity can be reduced
by allowing limited signaling among the different decision makers.
Therefore, in this second part of the two-part investigation, we apply the optimality conditions
derived in the first part to a variety of linear and nonlinear distributed stochastic differential
systems with decentralized noiseless information structures to derive optimal strategies. Our
investigation leads to the following conclusions.
1) When the dynamics are linear in the decision variables and nonlinear in the state variables,
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3and the pay-off is quadratic in the decision variable and nonlinear in the state variable, the
optimal decentralized strategies are given in terms of conditional expectations with respect
to the information structure on which they act on;
2) When the dynamics are linear in the state and the decision variables, and the pay-off is
quadratic in the state and the decision variables, then the optimal decentralized strategies
are computed in closed form, much as in the classical Linear-Quadratic Theory. However,
when the pay-off includes coupling between the decision makes the optimal strategy of
any player is also a function of the average value of the optimal strategies of the other
players.
3) The computation of the optimal strategies involves the solution of certain equations, which
can be formulated and solved via fixed point methods.
4) The computation complexity of the optimal decentralized strategies can be reduced by
signaling specific information among the decision makers and/or by considering certain
structure for the distributed system and pay-off.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce the distributed
stochastic system with decentralized information structures and the main assumption, and we
state the optimality conditions derived in [1]. In Section III, we apply to optimality conditions
to several forms of team games, and we show how the optimal decentralized strategies are
computed. For the case of linear differential dynamics and quadratic pay-off we obtain explicit
expressions of the optimal decentralized team strategies. The paper is concluded with some
comments on possible extensions of our results.
II. TEAM AND PERSON-BY-PERSON OPTIMALITY CONDITIONS
In this section we introduce the mathematical formulation of distributed stochastic systems with
decentralized noiseless information structures, and the optimality conditions derived in [1].
The formulation in [1] presupposes a fixed probability space with filtration,
(
Ω,F, {F0,t : t ∈
[0, T ]},P
)
satisfying the usual conditions, that is, (Ω,F,P) is complete, F0,0 contains all P-null
sets in F. All σ−algebras are assumed complete and right continuous, that is, F0,t = F0,t+
△
=⋂
s>t F0,s, ∀t ∈ [0, T ). We use the notation FT
△
= {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]} and similarly for the rest of
the filtrations.
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4The minimum principle in [1] is derived utilizing the following spaces. Let L2FT ([0, T ],Rn) ⊂
L2(Ω × [0, T ], dP × dt,Rn) ≡ L2([0, T ], L2(Ω,Rn)) denote the space of FT−adapted random
processes {z(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} such that
E
∫
[0,T ]
|z(t)|2Rndt <∞,
which is a sub-Hilbert space of L2([0, T ], L2(Ω,Rn)). Similarly, let L2FT ([0, T ],L(R
m,Rn)) ⊂
L2([0, T ], L2(Ω,L(Rm,Rn))) denote the space of FT−adapted n × m matrix valued random
processes {Σ(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} such that
E
∫
[0,T ]
|Σ(t)|2L(Rm,Rn)dt
△
= E
∫
[0,T ]
tr(Σ∗(t)Σ(t))dt <∞.
A. Distributed Stochastic Differential Decision Systems
A stochastic differential decision or control system is called distributed if it consists of an
interconnection of at least two subsystems and decision makers, whose actions are based on
decentralized information structures. The underlying assumption is that the decision makers are
allowed to exchange information on their law or strategy deployed, but not their actions.
Let
(
Ω,F, {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},P
)
denote a fixed complete filtered probability space on which we
shall define all processes. At this state we do not specify how {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]} came about,
but we require that Brownian motions are adapted to this filtration.
Admissible Decision Maker Strategies
The Decision Makers (DM) {ui : i ∈ ZN} take values in a closed convex subset of metric spaces
{(Mi, d) : i ∈ ZN}. Let GiT
△
= {Gi0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]} ⊂ {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]} denote the information
available to DM i, ∀i ∈ ZN . The admissible set of regular strategies is defined by
Uireg[0, T ]
△
=
{
ui ∈ L2
Gi
T
([0, T ],Rdi) : uit ∈ A
i ⊂ Rdi , a.e.t ∈ [0, T ], P− a.s.
}
, ∀i ∈ ZN . (1)
Clearly, Uireg[0, T ] is a closed convex subset of L2FT ([0, T ],R
n), for i = 1, 2, . . . , N , and ui :
[0, T ]× Ω→ Ai, {uit : t ∈ [0, T ]} is GiT−adapted, ∀i ∈ ZN .
An N tuple of DM strategies is by definition (u1, u2, . . . , uN) ∈ U(N)reg [0, T ]
△
= ×Ni=1U
i
reg[0, T ].
Distributed Stochastic Systems
On the probability space
(
Ω,F, {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},P
)
the distributed stochastic system consists
of an interconnection of N subsystems, and each subsystem i has, state space Rni , action space
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5Ai ⊂ Rdi , an exogenous noise space Rmi , and an initial state xi(0) = xi0, identified by the
following quantities.
(S1) xi(0) = xi0: an Rni-valued Random Variable;
(S2) {W i(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]}: an Rmi-valued standard Brownian motion which models the
exogenous state noise, adapted to FT , independent of xi(0);
Each subsystem is described by coupled stochastic differential equations of Itoˆ type as follows.
dxi(t) =f i(t, xi(t), uit)dt+ σ
i(t, xi(t), uit)dW
i(t) +
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
f ij(t, xj(t), ujt)dt
+
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
σij(t, xj(t), ujt)dW
j(t), xi(0) = xi0, t ∈ (0, T ], i ∈ ZN . (2)
Define the augmented vectors by
W
△
= (W 1,W 2, . . . ,WN) ∈ Rm, u
△
= (u1, u2, . . . , uN) ∈ Rd, x
△
= (x1, x2, . . . , xN) ∈ Rn.
The distributed system is described in compact form by
dx(t) = f(t, x(t), ut)dt+ σ(t, x(t), ut) dW (t), x(0) = x0, t ∈ (0, T ], (3)
where f : [0, T ]×Rn×A(N) −→ Rn denotes the drift and σ : [0, T ]×Rn×A(N) −→ L(Rm,Rn)
the diffusion coefficients.
Pay-off Functional
Given a u ∈ U(N)reg [0, T ] and (2) we define the reward or performance criterion by
J(u) ≡ J(u1, u2, . . . , uN)
△
= E
{∫ T
0
ℓ(t, x(t), ut)dt+ ϕ(x(T )
}
, (4)
where ℓ : [0, T ]× Rn × U(N) −→ (−∞,∞] denotes the running cost function and ϕ : Rn −→
(−∞,∞], the terminal cost function.
B. Team and Person-by-Person Optimality
In this section we give the precise definitions of team and person-by-person optimality for
regular strategies.
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6We consider the following information structures.
(NIS): Nonanticipative Information Structures. ui is adapted to the filtration GiT ⊂ FT gener-
ated by the σ−algbebra of nonlinear nonanticipative measurable functionals of any combination
of the subsystems Brownian motions {(W 1(t),W 2(t), . . . ,WN(t)) : t ∈ [0, T ]}, ∀i ∈ ZN .
This is often called open loop information, and it is the one used in classical stochastic control
with centralized full information to derive the maximum principe [27].
(FIS): Feedback Information Structures. ui is adapted to the filtration Gzi,uT generated by
the σ−algebra Gzi,u0,t
△
= σ{zi(s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t}, t ∈ [0, T ], where the observables zi are nonlinear
nonanticipative measurable functionals of any combination of the states defined by
zi(t) = hi(t, x), hi : [0, T ]× C([0, T ],Rn) −→ Rki, i ∈ ZN . (5)
Note that the index u emphasizes the fact that feedback strategies depend on u.
The set of admissible regular feedback strategies is defined by
U(N),z
u
reg [0, T ]
△
=
{
u ∈ U(N)reg [0, T ] : u
i
t is Gz
i,u
0,t −measurable, t ∈ [0, T ], i = 1, . . . , N
}
. (6)
Problem 1. (Team Optimality) Given the pay-off functional (4), constraint (3) the N tuple of
strategies uo △= (u1,o, u2,o, . . . , uN,o) ∈ U(N)reg [0, T ] is called nonanticipative team optimal if it
satisfies
J(u1,o, u2,o, . . . , uN,o) ≤ J(u1, u2, . . . , uN), ∀u
△
= (u1, u2, . . . , uN) ∈ U(N)reg [0, T ] (7)
Any uo ∈ U(N)reg [0, T ] satisfying (7) is called an optimal decision strategy (or control) and the
corresponding xo(·) ≡ x(·; uo(·)) (satisfying (4)) is called an optimal state process. Similarly,
feedback team optimal strategies are defined with respect to uo ∈ U(N),zureg [0, T ].
An alternative approach to handle such problems with decentralized information structures is
to restrict the definition of optimality to the so-called person-by-person equilibrium.
Define
J˜(v, u−i)
△
= J(u1, u2, . . . , ui−1, v, ui+1, . . . , uN)
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7Problem 2. (Person-by-Person Optimality) Given the pay-off functional (4), constraint (3) the
N tuple of strategies uo △= (u1,o, u2,o, . . . , uN,o) ∈ U(N)reg [0, T ] is called nonanticipative person-
by-person optimal if it satisfies
J˜(ui,o, u−i,o) ≤ J˜(ui, u−i,o), ∀ui ∈ Uireg[0, T ], ∀i ∈ ZN . (8)
Similarly, feedback person-by-person optimal strategies are defined with respect to uo ∈ U(N),zureg [0, T ].
Conditions (8) are analogous to the Nash equilibrium strategies of team games consisting of a
single pay-off and N DM. The person-by-person optimal strategy states that none of the N DM
with different information structures can deviate unilaterally from the optimal strategy and gain
by doing so.
C. Team and Person-by-Person Optimality Conditions
In this section we first introduce the assumptions on {f, σ, h, ℓ, ϕ} and then we state the
optimality conditions derived in [1].
Let B∞FT ([0, T ], L
2(Ω,Rn)) denote the space of FT -adapted Rn valued second order random
processes endowed with the norm topology ‖ · ‖ defined by
‖ x ‖2
△
= sup
t∈[0,T ]
E|x(t)|2Rn .
The main assumptions are stated below.
Assumptions 1. (Main assumptions)
Ui is closed and convex subset of Rdi , ∀i ∈ ZN , E|x(0)|Rn < ∞ and the maps of {f, σ, ℓ, ϕ}
satisfy the following conditions.
(A1) f : [0, T ]× Rn × A(N) −→ Rn is continuous in (t, x, u) and continously differentiable
with respect to x, u;
(A2) σ : [0, T ] × Rn × A(N) −→ L(Rm;Rn) is continuous in (t, x, u) and continously
differentiable with respect to x, u;
(A3) The first derivatives of {fx, σx, fu, σu} are bounded uniformly on [0, T ]× Rn × A(N).
(A4) ℓ : [0, T ]× Rn × A(N) −→ (−∞,∞] is Borel measurable, continuously differentiable
with respect to (x, u), ϕ : [0, T ]× Rn −→ (−∞,∞] is continously differentiable with
respect to x, ℓ(0, 0, t) is bounded, and there exist K1, K2 > 0 such that
|ℓx(t, x, u)|Rn + |ℓu(t, x, u)|Rd ≤ K1
(
1 + |x|Rn + |u|Rd
)
, |ϕx(x)|Rn ≤ K2
(
1 + |x|Rn
)
.
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8The following lemma states existence of solutions and their continuous dependence on the
decision variables.
Lemma 1. Suppose Assumptions 1 hold. Then for any F0,0-measurable initial state x0 having
finite second moment, and any u ∈ U(N)reg [0, T ], the following hold.
(1) System (3) has a unique solution x ∈ B∞FT ([0, T ], L2(Ω,Rn)) having a continuous
modification, that is, x ∈ C([0, T ],Rn), P−a.s, ∀i ∈ ZN .
(2) The solution of system (3) is continuously dependent on the control, in the sense that,
as ui,α −→ ui,o in Uireg[0, T ], ∀i ∈ ZN , xα
s
−→ xo in B∞FT ([0, T ], L
2(Ω,Rn)), ∀i ∈ ZN .
These statements also hold for feedback strategies u ∈ U(N),zureg [0, T ].
Proof: Proof is identical to that of [4].
Note that the differentiability of f, σ, ℓ with respect to u can be removed without affecting
the results (by considering either needle variations when deriving the maximum principle or by
deriving the maximum principle for relaxed strategies and then specializing it to regular strategies
as in [1]).
Assumptions 1 are used to derive optimality conditions for stochastic control problems with
nonanticipative centralized strategies. However, for stochastic control problems with feedback
centralized strategies additional assumptions are required to avoid certain technicalities associ-
ated with the derivation of the maximum principle. In [1] we identified these assumptions for
decentralized randomized feedback strategies; the main theorems are stated below.
Assumptions 2. The following holds.
(E1) The diffusion coefficients σ is restricted to the map σ : [0, T ]×Rn −→ L(Rn,Rn) (e.g.,
it is independent of u) and σ(·, ·) and σ−1(·, ·) are bounded.
Define the σ−algebras
F
x(0),W
0,t
△
= σ{x(0),W (s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t}, Fx
u
0,t
△
= σ{x(s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t}, ∀t ∈ [0, T ].
Under Assumptions 1, 2, if u ∈ U(N),z
u
reg [0, T ] then Fx(0),W0,t = Fx
u
0,t , ∀t ∈ [0, T ]. Thus, for any ui ∈
Uz
i,u
reg [0, T ] which is Gz
i,u
T −adapted there exists a function φi(·) measurable to a sub-σ−algebra of
F i0,t ⊂ F
x(0),W
0,t such that uit(ω) = φi(t, x(0),W (·
∧
t, ω)),P−a.s.ω ∈ Ω, ∀t ∈ [0, T ], i = 1, . . . N .
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9Define all such adapted nonanticipative functions by
U
i
reg[0, T ]
△
=
{
ui ∈ L2F i
T
([0, T ],Rdi) : uit ∈ U
i,zi,u
reg [0, T ]
}
, ∀i ∈ ZN . (9)
Next, we introduce the following additional assumptions.
Assumptions 3. The following hold.
(E2) Uzi,ureg [0, T ] is dense in U
i
reg[0, T ], ∀i ∈ ZN .
Under Assumptions 1 it can be shown that J(·) is continuous in the sense of U(N)reg [0, T ] and by
Assumptions 3 we have inf
u∈×Ni=1U
i
reg[0,T ]
J(u) = inf
u∈×Ni=1U
zi,u
reg [0,T ]
J(u). Hence, the necessary
conditions for feedback information structures u ∈ U(N),z
u
reg [0, T ] to be optimal are those for
which nonanticipative information structures u ∈ U(N)reg [0, T ] are optimal.
We now show that under Assumptions 1, 2 then Assumptions 3 holds.
Theorem 1. Consider Problem 1 under Assumptions 1, 2. Then
inf
u∈×Ni=1U
i
reg[0,T ]
J(u) = inf
u∈×Ni=1U
zi,u
reg [0,T ]
J(u).
Proof: We follow the procedure in [28]. For any ui ∈ Uzi,ureg [0, T ] which is Gzi,uT −adapted
we can define the set Uireg[0, T ], i = 1, . . . , N via (9). Let u ∈ U
(N)
reg [0, T ]
△
= ×Ni=1U
i
reg[0, T ] and
for k = T
M
, define
uik,t =

 u
i
0 for 0 ≤ t < k u0 ∈ Ai
1
k
∫ nk
(n−1)k
uisds for nk ≤ t(n + 1)k, n = 1, . . . ,M − 1,
(10)
for i = 1, . . .N . Then uk,t ≡ (u1k,t, . . . , uNk,t) ∈ U
(N)
reg [0, T ], and uk −→ u in L2FT ([0, T ],R
d). We
need to show that uk ∈ U(N),z
uk [0, T ]. Let xk(·) denote the trajectory corresponding to uk,·, and
F
xu
k
0,t the σ−algebra generated by {xk(s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t}. Define
Ik(t)
△
=
∫ t
0
σ(s, xk(s))dW (t) =xk(t)− x(0)−
∫ t
0
f(s, xk(s), uk,s)ds, (11)
and
W (t) =
∫ t
0
σ(s, xk(s))
−1dIk(s). (12)
Since uk ∈ U
(N)
reg [0, T ], then Ik(t) is F
xu
k
0,t−measurable, for 0 ≤ t < k. Hence,
F
x(0),W
0,t = F
xu
k
0,t , 0 ≤ t ≤ k. (13)
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Therefore, uk,t is F
xu
k
0,t−measurable for k ≤ t ≤ 2k. From the above equations it follows that
(13) also holds for k ≤ t ≤ 2k, and by induction that Fx(0),W0,t = Fx
u
k
0,t , ∀t ∈ [0, T ]. Therefore,
uik,t is also measurable with respect to F
xu
k
0,t . Hence, for any uit which is measurable with respect
to a nonanticipative functional zi = hi(t, x) there exists a nonanticipative functional of x(0),W
which realizes it.
Now, it is sufficient to show that as ui,α −→ ui in Uireg[0, T ], ∀i ∈ ZN , then J(uα) −→ J(u).
Utilizing Assumptions 1 we can show that E sups∈[0,t] |xα(s) − x(s)|Rn converges to zero as
α −→ 0, hence it is sufficient to show that |J(uα)− J(u)| also converges to zero, as α −→ 0.
By the mean value theorem we have the following inequality.
|J(uα)− J(u)| ≤K1 E
{∫
[0,T ]
(
|xα(t)|Rn + |u
α
t |Rd + |x(t)|Rn + |ut|Rd + 1
)
.
(
|xα(t)− x(t)|Rn + |u
α
t − ut|Rd
)
dt
}
+K2E
{(
|xα(T )|Rn + |x(T )|Rn + 1
)
|xα(T )− x(t)|Rn
}
. (14)
Since E sups∈[0,t] |xα(s)−x(s)|Rn −→ 0 as α −→ 0, then |J(uα)−J(u)| also converges to zero,
as α −→ 0.
Thus, under the assumptions of Theorem 1 if u ∈ U(N),z
u
reg [0, T ] achieves the infimum of J(u)
then it is also optimal with respect to U(N)reg [0, T ]
△
= ×Ni=1U
i
rel[0, T ]. Consequently, the necessary
conditions for feedback information structures u ∈ U(N),z
u
reg [0, T ] to be optimal are those for
which nonanticipative information structures u ∈ U(N)reg [0, T ] are optimal.
In the next remark we give an example for which Assumptions 2 hold, and hence Theorem 1 is
valid.
Remark 1. Suppose x1 and x2 are governed by the following stochastic differential equations
dx1(t) =f 1(t, x1(t), u1(t))dt+ σ1(t, x1(t))dW 1(t), x1(0) = x10, (15)
dx2(t) =f 2(t, x1(t), x2(t), u1(t), u2(t))dt+ σ2(t, x1(t), x2(t))dW 2(t), x2(0) = x20, (16)
z1(t) =h1(t, x1(t)), z2(t) = h2(t, x1(t), x2(t)), t ∈ [0, T ], (17)
where h1, h2 are measurable, W 1(·),W 2(·) are independent, and u1 ∈ U1,z1,ureg [0, T ], u2 ∈ U2,z
1,u,z2,u
reg [0, T ].
If we further assume that σi(·, ·), σi,−1(·, ·) are bounded, and Assumptions 1 hold, then Fx1,u0,t △=
σ{x1(s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t} = F
x1(0),W 1
0,t
△
= σ{x1(0),W (s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t}. Moreover, it can be shown
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that Fx
1,u,x2,u
0,t = F
x1(0),x2(0),W 1,W 2
0,t . Then we can find Uireg[0, T ], i = 1, 2 for which (E2) holds,
and thus Theorem 1 is valid.
Next, we state the main theorem which gives necessary and sufficient optimality conditions for
nonanticipative and feedback decisions.
Define the Hamiltonian
H : [0, T ]× Rn × Rn ×L(Rm,Rn)× A(N) −→ R,
by
H(t, x, ψ,Q, u)
△
= 〈f(t, x, u), ψ〉+ tr(Q∗σ(t, x, u)) + ℓ(t, x, u), t ∈ [0, T ]. (18)
For any u ∈ U(N)reg [0, T ], the adjoint process is (ψ,Q) ∈ L2FT ([0, T ],Rn)×L2FT ([0, T ],L(Rm,Rn))
satisfies the following backward stochastic differential equation
dψ(t) = −f ∗x(t, x(t), ut)ψ(t)dt− VQ(t)dt− ℓx(t, x(t), ut)dt+Q(t)dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ),
= −Hx(t, x(t), ψ(t), Q(t), ut)dt+Q(t)dW (t), (19)
ψ(T ) = ϕx(x(T )) (20)
where VQ ∈ L2FT ([0, T ],R
n) is given by 〈VQ(t), ζ〉 = tr(Q∗(t)σx(t, x(t), ut; ζ)), t ∈ [0, T ] (e.g.,
VQ(t) =
∑m
k=1
(
σ
(k)
x (t, x(t), ut)
)∗
Q(k)(t), t ∈ [0, T ], σ(k) is the kth column of σ, σ(k)x is the
derivative of σ(k) with respect to the state, for k = 1, 2, . . . , m, Q(k) is the kth column of Q).
The state process satisfies the stochastic differential equation
dx(t) = f(t, x(t), ut)dt+ σ(t, x(t), ut)dW (t), t ∈ (0, T ],
= Hψ(t, x(t), ψ(t), Q(t), ut)dt+ σ(t, x(t), ut)dW (t), (21)
x(0) = x0 (22)
The main theorem is stated below.
Theorem 2. (Team optimality) Consider Problem 1 under Assumptions 1, and assume existence
of an optimal team strategy.
(I) Suppose FT is the filtration generated by x(0) and the Brownian motion {W (t) : t ∈
[0, T ]}.
Necessary Conditions. For an element uo ∈ U(N)reg [0, T ] with the corresponding solution
xo ∈ B∞FT ([0, T ], L
2(Ω,Rn)) to be team optimal, it is necessary that the following hold.
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(1) There exists a semi martingale with the intensity process (ψo, Qo) ∈ L2FT ([0, T ],Rn)×
L2FT ([0, T ],L(R
m,Rn)).
(2) The variational inequality is satisfied:
N∑
i=1
E
{∫ T
0
〈Hui(t, x
o(t), ψo(t), Qo(t), uot ), u
i
t − u
i,o
t 〉dt
}
≥ 0, ∀u ∈ U(N)reg [0, T ].
(23)
(3) The process (ψo, Qo) ∈ L2FT ([0, T ],Rn)× L2FT ([0, T ],L(Rm,Rn)) is a unique
solution of the backward stochastic differential equation (19), (20), such that
uo ∈ U
(N)
reg [0, T ] satisfies the point wise almost sure inequalities with respect
to the σ-algebras Gi0,t ⊂ F0,t, t ∈ [0, T ], i = 1, 2, . . . , N :
〈E
{
Hui(t, x
o(t),ψo(t), Qo(t), uot )|G
i
0,t
}
, ui − ui,ot 〉 ≥ 0,
∀ui ∈ Ai, a.e.t ∈ [0, T ],P|Gi
0,t
− a.s., i = 1, 2, . . . , N (24)
Sufficient Conditions. Let (xo(·), uo(·)) denote an admissible state and deci-
sion pair and let ψo(·) the corresponding adjoint processes.
Suppose the following conditions hold.
(B1) H(t, ·, ψ, Q, ·), t ∈ [0, T ], is convex in (x, u) ∈ Rn × A(N);
(B2) ϕ(·), is convex in x ∈ Rn.
Then (xo(·), uo(·)) is optimal if it satisfies (24).
(II) Suppose FT is the filtration generated by x(0) and the Brownian motion {W (t) : t ∈
[0, T ]}, and Assumptions 3 hold. The necessary and sufficient conditions for a feedback
element uo ∈ U(N),z
u
reg [0, T ] to be optimal are given by the statements under Part (I)
with Gi0,t replaced by Gz
i,u
0,t , ∀t ∈ [0, T ].
Proof: See [29].
Next, we have the following corollary regarding person-by-person optimality.
Corollary 1. (Person-by-person optimality) Consider Problem 2 under the conditions of Theo-
rem 2. Then the necessary and sufficient condition of Theorem 2 hold with variational inequality
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(23) replaced by
E
{∫ T
0
〈Hui(t, x
o(t), ψo(t), Qo(t), uot ), u
i
t − u
i,o
t 〉dt
}
≥ 0, ∀ui ∈ Uireg[0, T ], ∀i ∈ ZN . (25)
Proof: See [1].
It can be shown by contradiction that the team and person-by-person optimality conditions
presented above are equivalent (see [1]).
Often in the application of the minimum principle we need to identify the the martingale term in
the adjoint process equation. One approach how to determine Q is discussed in the next remark.
Remark 2. Utilizing the Riesz representation theorem for Hilbert space martingles, in [1] the
adjoint process Q(·) in the adjoint equation (19), is identified as Q(t) ≡ ψx(t)σ(t, x(t), ut),
provided ψx exists (i.e., f, σ, ℓ, ϕ are twice continuously differentiable and fxx, σxx, ℓxx, ϕxx are
uniformly bounded).
Note that from the team optimality conditions presented above we also deduce the optimality
conditions for centralized full and partial information strategies. This observation is stated in the
next remark (for partial information strategies)
Remark 3. Consider Problem 1 under the conditions of Theorem 2, Part (I) and Part (II) and
assume ui are adapted the centralized partial information GT ⊂ FT , and centralized partial
information GzuT ⊂ Fxu0,T , respectively. Then the necessary conditions for GT−adapted ui’s are
given by the following point wise almost sure inequalities
E
{
H(t, xo(t), ψo(t), Qo(t), u)|G0,t
}
≥ E
{
H(t, xo(t), ψ(t), Q(t), uot )|G0,t
}
,
∀u ∈ A(N), a.e.t ∈ [0, T ],P|G0,t − a.s., (26)
where {xo(t), ψo(t), Qo(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} are the solutions of the Hamiltonian system (21), (22),
(19), (20), while for GzuT −adapted ui’s the necessary condition is (26) with the conditioning
done with respect to GzuT . This corresponds to the partial information investigated in [4].
III. OPTIMAL TEAM STRATEGIES FOR CLASSES OF GAMES
We are now ready to derive explicit optimal team strategies for general classes of team games,
when the dynamics and the reward have certain structures. These include nonlinear as well as
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linear distributed systems. Our focus is on optimal decentralized strategies which are given in
a) closed form involving conditional expectations based on the information structures available
to the DM’s and b) closed expressions similar to the classical Linear-Quadratic Theory.
First, we define the main classes of team games we shall investigate.
Definition 1. (Team games with special structures) We define the following forms of team games.
(GNF): Generalized Normal Form. The team game is said to have ”generalized normal form”
if
f(t, x, u)
△
=b(t, x) + g(t, x)u, g(t, x)u
△
=
N∑
j=1
g(j)(t, x)uj , (27)
σ(t, x, u)
△
=
[
κ(1)(t, x) κ(2)(t, x) . . . κ(m)(t, x)
]
+
[
s1(t, x)u s2(t, x)u . . . sm(t, x)u
]
, (28)
ℓ(t, x, u)
△
=
1
2
〈u,R(t, x)u〉+
1
2
λ(t, x) + 〈u, η(t, x)〉, (29)
where 〈u,R(t, x)u〉 △=
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
ui,∗Rij(t, x)u
j , 〈u, η(t, x)〉
△
=
N∑
i=1
ui,∗ηi(t, x),
and κ(i)(·, ·) is the ith column of an n × m matrix κ(·, ·), for i = 1, 2, . . . , m, si(·, ·) is an
n × d matrix, for i = 1, 2, . . . , m, R(·, ·) is symmetric uniformly positive definite, and λ(·, ·) is
uniformly positive semidefinite.
GNF refers to the case when the drift and diffusion coefficients f, σ are linear in the decision
variable u, and the pay-off function ℓ is quadratic in u, while f, σ, ℓ, ϕ are nonlinear in x.
(SGNF): Simplified Generalized Normal Form. A team game is said to have ”simplified
generalized normal form” if it is of generalized normal form and σ(t, x, u) is independent of u,
that is, sj = 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ m in (28).
SGNF refers to the case when f is linear in u, σ is independent of u, ℓ is quadratic in u, and
f, σ, ℓ are nonlinear in x.
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(NF): Normal Form. A team game is said to have ”normal form” if
f(t, x, u) =A(t)x+ b(t) +B(t)u, (30)
σ(t, x, u)
△
=
[
κ1(t)x κ2(t)x . . . κm(t)x
]
+
[
s1(t)u s2(t)u . . . sm(t)u
]
+G(t), (31)
ℓ(t, x) =
1
2
〈u,R(t)u〉+
1
2
〈x,H(t)x〉+ 〈x, F (t)〉+ 〈u,E(t)x〉+ 〈u,m(t)〉, (32)
ϕ(x) =
1
2
〈x,M(T )x〉 + 〈x,N(T )〉, (33)
and κi(·) ∈ L(Rn;Rn) for i = 1, . . . , m, si(·) ∈ L(Rd;Rn) for i = 1, . . . , m, and R(·) is
symmetric uniformly positive definite, H(·) is symmetric uniformly positive semidefinite, and
M(T ) is symmetric positive semidefinite.
NF refers to the case when f, σ are linear is x, u, and ℓ, ϕ are quadratic in x, u. Therefore, the
dynamics also include stochastic integral terms which are linear is x, u.
(LQF): Linear-Quadratic Form. A team game is said to have ”normal form” if
f(t, x, u) =A(t)x+B(t)u, σ(t, x, u) = G(t), (34)
ℓ(t, x) =
1
2
〈u,R(t)u〉+
1
2
〈x,H(t)x〉, ϕ(x) =
1
2
〈x,M(T )x〉, (35)
and R(·) is symmetric uniformly positive definite, H(·) is symmetric uniformly positive semidef-
inite, and M(T ) is symmetric positive semidefinite.
NF refers to the case when f is linear in x, u, σ is independent of x, u, and ℓ, ϕ are quadratic in
x, u; this is the classical linear-quadratic (dynamics, pay-off) model often utilized in centralized
decision making.
Below we compute the optimal strategies for the different cases of Definition 1. Although,
we utilized nonanticipative strategies U(N)reg [0, T ], these computations can be done for feedback
strategies U(N),z
u
reg [0, T ].
Case GNF.
Utilizing the definition of Hamiltonian (18), its derivative is given by
Hu(t, x, ψ,Q, u) = g
∗(t, x)ψ +
m∑
i=1
s∗i (t, x)Q
(i)(t) +R(t, x)u+ η(t, x), (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn.(36)
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Since the diffusion coefficient σ depends on u, then Qo(·) also depends on the control and by
Remark 2, Qo is given by
Qo(t) =ψox(t)σ(t, x
o(t), uot ), (37)
Q(i),o(t) =ψox(t)
{
κ(i)(t, xo) + si(t, x
o)uot
}
, t ∈ [0, T ], i = 1, 2, . . . , m. (38)
Define the quantities
Λ(t, x, ψx)
△
=
m∑
i=1
s∗i (t, x)ψx(t)κ
(i)(t, x) ≡


Λ1
Λ2
. . .
ΛN

 (t, x, ψx),
M(t, x, ψx)
△
=
m∑
i=1
s∗i (t, x)ψx(t)si(t, x) ≡


M11 M12 . . . M1N
M21 M22 . . . M2N
. . . . . . . . . . . .
MN1 MN2 . . . MNN

 (t, x, ψx),
where Λi ∈ L(Rm,Rdi), Mij ∈ L(Rdj ,Rdi), i, j = 1, 2, . . . , N .
By Theorem 2, substituting Qo(·) given by (38) into (36), and utilizing the fact that ui,ot is
Gi0,t−adapted for each i ∈ ZN , the explicit expression for u
i,o
t is obtained from (24), and it is
given by
u
i,o
t =−
{
E
(
(Rii +Mii)(t, x
o(t), ψox(t))|G
i
0,t
)}−1{
E
(
ηi(t, xo(t)) + Λi(t, xo(t), ψox(t))|G
i
0,t
)
+
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
E
(
(Rij +Mij)(t, x
o(t), ψox(t))u
j,o
t |G
i
0,t
)
+ E
(
g(i),∗(t, x)ψo(t)|Gi0,t
)}
, P|Gi
0,t
− a.s., i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (39)
Next, we make some observations.
(O1): At any t ∈ [0, T ], ui,ot is a functional of estimates of all other optimal decisions
u
j,o
t , j 6= i given its own information. Such strategies impose a heavy computational
burden on any decentralized decision maker. Therefore, a question which might be of
interest to address, is ”what information needs to be signal among the DM’s to reduce
computations?” The answer to this question will become apparent when we proceed to
compute the explicit expressions of the optimal strategies.
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(O2): In the simplified case of diagonal M,R, the right side of (39) does not depend directly
on estimates of the other DM’s, but this dependence is hidden in the adjoint process
ψo(·). In fact, since no communication exchange is allowed between the DM’s, then
any communication between them is made via the interaction of the DM’s with the
state and adjoint processes xo(·), ψo(·). One may view the stochastic differential system
together with the adjoint backward stochastic differential equation as playing the role
of a channel that makes communication between the DM’s possible. Therefore, an
interesting question is ”can we quantify the amount of information communicated
among the DM’s via the Hamiltonian system of equations and if so, can we utilize
this insight to reduce the computational burden, by allowing limited signaling between
the DM’s?” We shall return to this question and identify the variable which are involved
in such communication between the DMs.
Finally, note that the optimal strategies can be further simplified by assuming g(t, x) is linear
in x and σ(t, ·, u) is linear in x, R(·, ·) is independent of x, λ(·, ·) is quadratic in x, and η(·, ·)
is linear in x.
Case SNF.
For a team game of simplified generalized form, the diffusion coefficient σ is independent of
u, therefore the second right hand side term of (36) is zero (since si = 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , m), and
the derivative of the Hamiltonian is linear in u. Therefore, the explicit expressions for ui,o are
obtained from (39) by setting Mij = 0,Λi = 0, i, j = 1, . . . , N , hence
u
i,o
t =−
{
E
(
Rii(t, x
o(t))|Gi0,t
)}−1{
E
(
ηi(t, xo(t))|Gi0,t
)
+
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
E
(
Rij(t, x
o(t))uj,ot |G
i
0,t
)
− E
(
g(i),∗(t, x)ψo(t)|Gi0,t
)}
, P|Gi
0,t
− a.s., i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (40)
By comparing the optimal strategies for GNF given by (39) and (40) we have the following
observation.
(O3): When σ is independent of u, then the adjoint process Qo(·) is independent of uo, and
therefore the optimal strategies do not involve derivatives of the adjoint process ψx(·)
as in (39).
(O4): The team game formulation also includes as a special case, distributed estimation as
follows. Suppose each component of the vector x △= (x1, . . . xN ) denotes the channel
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output at different distributed receivers carrying an information message (RV) θ △=
(θ1, . . . θN), θi : Ω −→ Rni, i = 1, . . . , N , and each channel is subject to feedback and
interference from the other channels. Then each channel outputs can be described by
dxi(t) =bi(t, xi(t), θi)dt+ κi(t, xi(t))dW i +
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
bij(t, xj(t), θj)dt
+
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
κij(t, xj(t))dW j, xi(0) = xi0, i = 1, . . . N. (41)
Thus, {xi(t) : 0 ≤ t ≤ T} describes the channel output of the ith receiver which is
subject to feedback and interference from the other channels, θi is the message to be
estimated at the ith receiver, and uit({xi(s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t}) is its team optimal estimator
at time t ∈ [0, T ], based on having access to xi. Then the optimal distributed team
estimators are obtained from (40), and they are given by the following equation.
u
i,o
t = −
{
E
(
Rii(t, x(t))|G
xi
0,t
)}−1{
E
(
ηi(t, x(t))|Gx
i
0,t
)
+
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
E
(
Rij(t, x(t))u
j,o
t |G
xi
0,t
)}
,
P|
Gx
i
0,t
− a.s., i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (42)
One may consider several other scenarios of distributed estimation by considering
specific pay-off function ℓ(t, x, u) which represents estimation error.
Case NF.
For a team game of normal form define the quantities
Λ(t, x, ψx)
△
=
m∑
i=1
s∗i (t)ψx(t)
(
κi(t)x+G
(i)(t)
)
≡


Λ1(t, x, ψx)
Λ2(t, x, ψx)
. . .
ΛN(t, x, ψx)

 , Λ
i ∈ L(Rn,Rdi), i = 1, . . . , N,
M(t, ψx)
△
=
m∑
i=1
s∗i (t)ψx(t)si(t) ≡


M 11 M 12 . . . M 1N
M 21 M 22 . . . M 2N
. . . . . . . . . . . .
MN1 MN2 . . . MNN

 (t, ψx),
where M ij ∈ L(Rdj ,Rdi), i, j = 1, 2, . . . , N. Then from the optimal strategies under GNF one
December 13, 2017 DRAFT
19
obtains
u
i,o
t =−
{
Rii(t) + E
[
M ii(t, ψ
o
x(t))|G
i
0,t
]}−1{
mi(t) + E
[ n∑
j=1
Eij(t)x
j,o(t) + Λi(t, xo(t)ψx)|G
i
0,t
]
+
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
(
(Rij + E
[
M ij(t, ψx(t))u
j,o
t |G
i
0,t
]
+B(i),∗(t)E
[
ψo(t)|Gi0,t
]}
, P|Gi
0,t
− a.s., i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (43)
Another important observations is the following.
(O5): The expressions of the optimal team strategies can be written in a fixed point form.
This is described next for the case LQF.
Case LQF with E 6= 0, m 6= 0.
For a team game of linear-quadratic form (with E,m non-zero) then from the previous optimal
strategies one obtains
u
i,o
t =−R
−1
ii (t)
{ n∑
j=1
Eij(t)E
(
xj,o(t)|Gi0,t
)
+mi(t) +
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
Rij(t)E
(
u
j,o
t |G
i
0,t
)
+B(i),∗(t)E
(
ψo(t)|Gi0,t
)}
, P|Gi
0,t
− a.s., i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (44)
Note that (44) can be put in the form of fixed point matrix equation with random coefficients
as follows. Define
ûi,j,o(t)
△
=E
(
u
i,o
t |G
j
0,t
)
, x̂i,j,o(t)
△
= E
(
xi,o(t)|Gj0,t
)
,
ûi,o(t)
△
=V ector{û1,i,o(t), . . . , ûN,i,o(t)}, x̂i,o(t)
△
= V ector{x̂1,i,o(t), . . . , x̂N,i,o(t)}, i, j = 1 . . . , N,
ûo(t)
△
=V ector{û1,o(t), . . . , ûN,o(t)}, x̂o(t)
△
= V ector{x̂1,o(t), . . . , x̂N,o(t)}, (45)
ψ̂o(t)
△
=V ector{E
(
ψo(t)|G10,t
)
, . . . ,E
(
ψo(t)|GN0,t
)
},
R[i](t) =
[
Ri1(t), . . . , RiN (t)
]
, E[i](t) =
[
Ei1(t), . . . , EiN (t)
]
, i = 1, . . . , N. (46)
Taking expectation of both sides of (44) with respect to Gi0,t then (44) is written in terms of
linear equation with random coefficients as follows.
diag{R[1](t), . . . , R[N ](t)}ûo(t)+ diag{E[1](t), . . . , E[N ](t)}x̂o(t)
+ diag{B(1),∗(t), . . . , B(N),∗(t)}ψ̂o(t) +m(t) = 0. (47)
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Clearly, (47) can be solved via fixed point methods, provided we determine the estimates
x̂o(t), ψ̂o(t). In the next subsection we determine the estimate x̂o(t), and also show that ψ̂o(t)
can be expressed in terms of the estimates x̂o(t), ûo(t).
We conclude this section by observing that the optimal team strategies involve conditional
expectations with respect to the DMs information structures. These conditional expectations
can be simplified considerably by allowing signaling between the different DMs.
A. Team Games of Normal Form: Explicit Expressions of Adjoint Processes
In this section we concentrate on Normal Form (and Linear-Quadratic Form) games, and we
derive explicit expressions for the adjoint processes of ψo(·), Qo(·) as a functional of xo(·), uo(·).
Note that this is a necessary step before one proceeds with the computation of the explicit form
of the optimal decentralized strategies, or the computation of them via fixed point methods as
in (47).
For a game of Normal Form the Hamiltonian system of equations are the following.
H(t, x, ψ,Q, u) =〈A(t)x+ b(t) +Bu, ψ〉+ tr
(
Q∗σ(t, x, u)
)
+
1
2
〈x,H(t)x〉+
1
2
〈u,R(t)u〉+ 〈x, F (t)〉+ 〈u,E(t)x〉+ 〈u,m(t)〉, (48)
where σ is given by (31). The derivative of the Hamiltonian with respect to u is
Hu(t, x, ψ,Q, u) = B
∗(t)ψ +R(t)u+ E(t)x+m(t) +
m∑
i=1
s∗i (t)Q
(i)(t). (49)
Let (xo(·), ψo(·), Qo(·)) denote the solutions of the Hamiltonian system, corresponding to the
optimal control uo, then
dxo(t) =A(t)xo(t)dt+ b(t)dt +B(t)uotdt+
m∑
i=1
(
κi(t)x
+ si(t)u
o
t
)
dWi(t) +G(t)dW (t), x
o(0) = x0, (50)
dψo(t) =− A∗(t)ψo(t)dt−H(t)xo(t)dt− F (t)dt−E∗(t)uotdt
− VQo(t)dt+Q
o(t)dW (t), ψo(T ) = M(T )xo(T ) +N(T ), (51)
VQo(t) =
m∑
i=1
κ∗i (t)Q
(i),o(t), (52)
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Next, we find the form of the solution of the adjoint equation (51) (and also identify the
martingale term in (51) via an alternative method to Remark 2). Let {Φ(t, s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T}
denote the transition operator of A(·) and Φ∗(·, ·) that of the adjoint A∗(·) of A(·). Then we
have the identity ∂
∂s
Φ∗(t, s) = −A∗(s)Φ∗(t, s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T . One can verify by differentiation
that the solution {ψo(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} of (51), is given by
ψo(t) =Φ∗(T, t)M(T )xo(T ) +N(T ) +
∫ T
t
Φ∗(s, t)
{
H(s)xo(s)ds+ F (s)ds+ E∗(s)uosds
+ VQo(s)ds−Q
o(s)dW (s)
}
. (53)
Since for any control policy, {xo(s) : 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T} is uniquely determined from (50) and its
current value xo(t), then (53) can be expressed via
ψo(t) = Σ(t)xo(t) + βo(t), t ∈ [0, T ], (54)
where Σ(·), βo(·) determine the operators to the one expressed via (53).
Next, we determine the operators (Σ(·), βo(·)). Differentiating both sides of (54) and using (50),
(51) yields
−A∗(t)ψo(t)dt−H(t)xo(t)dt− F (t)dt− E∗(t)uotdt− VQo(t)dt+Q
o(t)dW (t)
=Σ˙(t)xo(t)dt+ Σ(t)
{
A(t)xo(t)dt+ b(t)dt+B(t)uotdt
+
m∑
i=1
(
κi(t)x
o(t) + si(t)u
o
t
)
dWi(t) +G(t)dW (t)
}
+ dβo(t). (55)
By matching the intensity of the martingale terms {·}dW (t) in (55) we obtain
Qi,o(t) =ψox(t)σ
(i)(t, xo(t), uot ) = Σ(t)
(
κi(t)x
o(t) + si(t)u
o
t +G
(i)(t)
)
, t ∈ [0, T ], i = 1, . . . , m,
(56)
and by (52) we also obtain
VQo(t) =
m∑
i=1
κ∗i (t)Σ(t)
(
κi(t)x
o(t) + si(t)u
o
t +G
(i)(t)
)
, t ∈ [0, T ]. (57)
Clearly, Qo given by (56) is precisely the one predicted by Remark 2.
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Substituting the claimed relation (54) into (55) we obtained the identity{
− A∗(t)Σ(t)− Σ(t)A(t)−H(t)−
m∑
i=1
κ∗i (t)Σ(t)κi(t)− Σ˙(t)
}
xo(t)dt+
m∑
i=1
Q(i),o(t)dWi(t)
=A∗(t)βo(t)dt + Σ(t)b(t) + Σ(t)B(t)uotdt+
m∑
i=1
κ∗i (t)Σ(t)
(
si(t)u
o
t +G
(i)(t)
)
dt
+ Σ(t)
m∑
i=1
(
κi(t)x
o(t) + si(t)u
o
t +G
(i)(t)
)
dWi(t) + F (t)dt+ E
∗(t)uot + dβ
o(t).
(58)
Therefore, from (58), (56) we deduce
Σ˙(t)+A∗(t)Σ(t) + Σ(t)A(t) +
m∑
i=1
κ∗i (t)Σ(t)κi(t) +H(t) = 0, Σ(T ) = M(T ), (59)
β˙o(t) + A∗(t)βo(t) + Σ(t)b(t) + F (t) + Σ(t)B(t)uotdt+ E
∗(t)uot
+
m∑
i=1
κ∗i (t)Σ(t)
(
si(t)u
o
t +G
(i)(t)
)
= 0, βo(T ) = N(T ). (60)
The closed form expressions of the adjoint processes (ψo(·), Qo(·)) of this section are required
in order to explicitly compute the closed form expression of the optimal decentralized strategies
or apply fixed point methods via (47) (in addition to solving centralized problems).
Next we find the optimal strategy assuming centralized information structure for each DM, and
then we determine the optimal strategies assuming decentralized information structures for each
DM. The reason we pursue centralized strategies is to gain additional insight into its differences
when compared to decentralized strategies, both in the procedure and the amount of complexity
involved in implementing centralized versus decentralized strategies.
B. Centralized Information Structure: NF and LQF
First, we consider a centralized information structure and we compute the optimal strategy
for team games of Normal and Linear-Quadratic forms. For any t ∈ [0, T ] the information
structure Gx
u
0,t
△
= Gx
1,u
0,t
∨
Gx
2,u
0,t . . .
∨
Gx
N,u
0,t is available to all DMs and it is the σ−algebra Gx
u
0,t
△
=
σ{(x1(s), x2(s), . . . , xN (s)) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t} (we assume a strong formulation so the informa-
tion depends on u). If instead, we consider nonanticipative centralized information structure
G
x(0),W
0,t
△
= G
x1(0),W 1
0,t
∨
G
x2(0),W 2
0,t . . .
∨
G
xN (0),WN
0,t then the final results are the same. This is a
common (centralized) full information structure decision strategy hence, the optimal decision
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{uot : 0 ≤ t ≤ T} is found via
E
{
Hu(t, x
o(t), ψo(t), Qo(t), uot )|G
xo
0,t
}
= 0, a.e.t ∈ [0, T ], P|Gxo
0,t
− a.s. (61)
where (xo(·), ψo(·), Qo(·)) are solutions of the Hamiltonian system (50), (51) corresponding to
uo. Since (ψo(·), Qo(·)) are given by (54) and (56), respectively, all we need to do is to determine
uo as a functional of xo.
We show the following claims.
LQF. When the system dynamics and pay-off are of Linear-Quadratic Form, the optimal cen-
tralized strategy is given by
uot = −R
−1(t)B∗(t)K(t)xo(t), t ∈ [0, T ], (62)
where the operator K(t) ∈ L(Rn,Rn) is the symmetric positive semidefinite solution of the
differential equation
K˙(t) + A∗(t)K(t) +K(t)A(t)−K(t)B(t)R−1(t)B∗(t)K(t) +H(t) = 0, t ∈ [0, T ), (63)
K(T ) = M(T ). (64)
NF with E = 0. When the system dynamics and pay-off are of Normal Form (with E = 0), the
optimal centralized strategy is given by
uot =−
(
R(t) +
m∑
i=1
s∗i (t)K(t)si(t)
)−1{(
B∗(t)K(t) +
m∑
i=1
s∗i (t)K(t)κi(t)
)
xo(t)
+m(t) +B∗(t)r(t)
}
, t ∈ [0, T ], (65)
where the operator K(t) ∈ L(Rn,Rn) is symmetric positive semidefinite, and r(t) ∈ Rn, and
they are solutions of the differential equations
K˙(t) + A∗(t)K(t) +K(t)A(t) +
m∑
i=1
κ∗i (t)K(t)κi(t) +H(t)
−
(
K(t)B(t) +
m∑
i=1
κ∗i (t)K(t)si(t)
)(
R(t) +
m∑
i=1
s∗i (t)K(t)si(t)
)−1(
B∗(t)K(t)
+
m∑
i=1
s∗i (t)K(t)κi(t)
)
= 0, t ∈ [0, T ), (66)
K(T ) = M(T ), (67)
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r˙(t) +
{
A∗(t)−
(
K(t)B(t) +
m∑
i=1
κ∗i (t)K(t)si(t)
)(
R(t) +
m∑
i=1
s∗i (t)K(t)si(t)
)−1
B∗(t)
}
+ F (t) +K(t)b(t)
−
(
K(t)B(t) +
m∑
i=1
κ∗i (t)K(t)si(t)
)(
R(t) +
m∑
i=1
s∗i (t)K(t)si(t)
)−1
m(t), t ∈ [[0, T ), (68)
r(T ) = N(T ). (69)
Next, we verify the claim stated under LQF and we leave the claim stated under NF to the
reader since its derivation is similar.
Derivation of LQF Solution. From (61) the optimal strategy is
uot = −R
−1(t)B∗(t)E
{
ψo(t)|Gx
o
0,t
}
, t ∈ [0, T ], (70)
where (xo(·), ψo(·), Qo(·)) denote the solutions of the following Hamiltonian system, correspond-
ing to the optimal control uo
dxo(t) =A(t)xo(t)dt+B(t)uotdt+G(t)dW (t), x
o(0) = x0 (71)
dψo(t) =−A∗(t)ψo(t)dt−H(t)xo(t)dt− VQo(t)dt+ Q
o(t)dW (t), ψo(T ) = M(T )xo(T )
(72)
VQo(t) =0, Q
o(t) = Σ(t)G(t). (73)
Then {ψo(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} is given by (53) with F = 0, E = 0, hence
ψo(t) = Φ∗(T, t)M(T )xo(T ) +
∫ T
t
Φ∗(s, t)
{
H(s)xo(s)ds−Qo(s)dW (s)
}
. (74)
For any admissible decision u and corresponding (x(·), ψ(·)) define their filtered versions by
x(t)
△
= E
{
x(t)|Gx0,t
}
= x(t), ψ(t)
△
= E
{
ψ(t)|Gx0,t
}
, u(t)
△
= E
{
ut|G
x
0,t
}
= ut, t ∈ [0, T ],
and their predicted versions by
x(s, t)
△
= E
{
x(s)|Gx0,t
}
, ψ(s, t)
△
= E
{
ψ(s)|Gx0,t
}
, u(s, t)
△
= E
{
us|G
x
0,t
}
, 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T.
From (70) the optimal strategy is
uot ≡ −R
−1(t)B∗(t)ψo(t), t ∈ [0, T ]. (75)
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Taking conditional expectations on both sides of (74) with respect to Gxo0,t yields
ψo(t) = Φ∗(T, t)M(T )xo(T, t) +
∫ T
t
Φ∗(s, t)H(s)xo(s, t)ds, t ∈ [0, T ], (76)
where we utilized the fact that
E
{∫ T
t
Φ∗(s, t)Qo(s)dW (s)|Gx
o
0,t
}
= E
{
E
{∫ T
t
Φ∗(s, t)Qo(s)dW (s)|F0,t
}
|Gx
o
0,t
}
= 0.
The predictor version of xo(·) is obtained from (71) utilizing the fact that the last right hand
side of this equation is a stochastic integral with respect to Brownian motion, hence
dxo(s, t) = A(s)xo(s, t)dt+B(s)uo(s, t), t < s ≤ T, (77)
xo(t, t) = xo(t) = xo(t), t ∈ [0, T ). (78)
Since for any policy and hence for the optimal uo, {xo(s, t) : 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T} is uniquely
determined from (77) and the current value xo(t, t) = xo(t) via (71), then (76) can be expressed
via
ψo(t) = K(t)xo(t) = K(t)xo(t), t ∈ [0, T ], (79)
where K(·) determines the operator to the one expressed via (76). Substituting (79) into (75)
we obtain (62). Let {ΨK(t, s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T} denote the transition operator of AK(t) △=(
A(t)− B(t)R−1(t)B∗(t)K(t)
)
and recall that the identities ∂
∂t
ΨK(t, s) = AK(t)ΨK(t, s), 0 ≤
s ≤ t ≤ T , ∂
∂t
ΨK(s, t) = −ΨK(s, t)AK(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T .
Next, we determine K(·). Substituting the solution of (77), (78), specifically, xo(s, t) = ΨK(s, t)xo(t), 0 ≤
t ≤ s ≤ T into (76) we have
ψo(t) =
{
Φ∗(T, t)M(T )ΨK(T, t) +
∫ T
t
Φ∗(s, t)H(s)ΨK(s, t)ds
}
xo(t), t ∈ [0, T ], (80)
and thus K(·) is identified by the operator
K(t)
△
= Φ∗(T, t)M(T )ΨK(T, t) +
∫ T
t
Φ∗(s, t)H(s)ΨK(s, t)ds, t ∈ [0, T ]. (81)
Differentiating both sides of (81) yields the following differential equation for K(·).
K˙(t) =
∂
∂t
Φ∗(T, t)M(T )ΨK(T, t) + Φ
∗(T, t)M(T )
∂
∂t
ΨK(T, t)−H(t)
+
∫ T
t
∂
∂t
Φ∗(s, t)H(s)ΨK(s, t)ds+
∫ T
t
Φ∗(s, t)H(s)
∂
∂t
ΨK(s, t)ds
= −A∗(t)Φ∗(T, t)M(T )ΨK(T, t)− Φ
∗(T, t)M(T )ΨK(T, t)AK(t)−H(t)
−
∫ T
t
A∗(t)Φ∗(s, t)H(s)ΨK(s, t)ds−
∫ T
t
Φ∗(s, t)H(s)ΨK(s, t)AK(t)ds. (82)
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Using (81) in the previous equations we obtain the matrix differential equation (63), (64).
An alternative approach is to utilize (54), (59), (60) (with κi, b, F, E, si = 0) which implies
ψo(t) = Σ(t)xo(t) +
∫ T
t
Φ∗(s, t)Σ(s)B(s)uosds. (83)
Then replace uo(·) in (83) by (75) and take conditional expectation to obtain
ψ
o
(t) = Σ(t)xo(t)−
∫ T
t
Φ∗(s, t)Σ(s)B(s)R−1(s)B∗(s)E
{
ψo(s)|Gx
o
0,t
}
ds. (84)
Next, assume ψo(t) = K(t)x(t), for some K(·), and then substitute this in (84) to obtain
K(t) = Σ(t)−
∫ T
t
Φ∗(s, t)Σ(s)B(s)R−1(s)B∗(s)K(s)ΨK(s, t)ds. (85)
By utilizing the equation for Σ(·) it can be shown that (85) is a solution of (63), (64).
The previous calculations demonstrate how to compute the optimal strategy when both decision
variables are based on centralized information structures, and its is precisely the optimal strategy
obtained via variety of other methods in the literature.
Note that certain computations presented above are also required to compute an expression for
the estimate ψ̂o(t) entering the fixed point equation (47).
Finally, one can verify that the necessary conditions of optimality of Theorem 2 utilized to derive
the above optimal strategy are also sufficient. Specifically, in view of Theorem 2 it suffices to
show convexity of ϕ(x) = 1
2
〈x,M(T )x〉 + 〈x,N(T )〉 and joint convexity of the Hamiltonian
H(t, x, ψ,Q, u) in (x, u). Since M(T ) ≥ 0 then ϕ(x) is convex, and since H(·) ≥ 0, R(·) > 0
then H(t, x, ψ,Q, u) is convex in (x, u).
C. Decentralized Information Structures for LQF
In this section we invoke the minimum principle to compute the optimal strategies for team
games of Linear-Quadratic Form. We consider decentralized strategies based on 1) nonanticipa-
tive information structures, and 2) feedback information structures. Without loss of generality
we assume the distributed stochastic dynamical decision systems consists of an interconnection
of two subsystems, each governed by a linear stochastic differential equation with coupling. The
generalizations to an arbitrary number of interconnected subsystems will be given as a corollary.
Consider the distributed dynamics described below.
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Subsystem Dynamics 1:
dx1(t) =A11(t)x
1(t)dt+B11(t)u
1
tdt+G11(t)dW
1(t)
+ A12(t)x
2(t)dt+B12(t)u
2
tdt, x
1(0) = x10, t ∈ (0, T ], (86)
Subsystem Dynamics 2:
dx2(t) =A22(t)x
2(t)dt+B22(t)u
2
tdt+G22(t)dW
2(t)
+ A21(t)x
1(t)dt+B21u
1
tdt, x
2(0) = x20, t ∈ (0, T ] (87)
For any t ∈ [0, T ] the information structure of u1t of subsystem 1 is the σ−algebra G10,t, and
information structure of u2t of subsystem 2 is the σ−algebra G20,t. These information structures
are defined shortly.
Pay-off Functional:
J(u1, u2) =
1
2
E
{∫ T
0
[
〈

 x1(t)
x2(t)

 , H(t)

 x1(t)
x2(t)

〉+ 〈

 u1t (t)
u2t (t)

 , R(t)

 u1t (t)
u2t (t)

〉]dt
+ 〈

 x1(T )
x2(T )

 ,M(T )

 x1(T )
x2(T )

〉}. (88)
We assume that the initial condition x(0), the system Brownian motion {W (t) : t ∈ [0, T ]}, and
the observations Brownian motion {B1(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]}, and {B2(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} are mutually
independent and x(0) is Gaussian (E(x(0)), Cov(x(0))) = (x¯0, P0).
Define the augmented variables by
x
△
=

 x1
x2

 , u △=

 u1
u2

 , ψ △=

 ψ1
ψ2

 , Q △=

 Q1
Q2

 , W △=

 W 1
W 2

 (89)
and matrices by
A
△
=

 A11 A12
A21 A22

 , B △=

 B11 B12
B21 B22

 , B(1) △=

 B11
B21

 , B(2) △=

 B12
B22

 , G △=

 G11 0
0 G22

 .
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Let (xo(·), ψo(·), Qo(·)) denote the solutions of the Hamiltonian system, corresponding to the
optimal control uo, then
dxo(t) =A(t)xo(t)dt+B(t)uotdt+G(t)dW (t), x
o(0) = x0, (90)
dψo(t) =− A∗(t)ψo(t)dt−H(t)xo(t)dt− V oQ(t)dt+Q
o(t)dW (t), ψo(T ) = M(T )xo(T ),
(91)
VQo(t) =0, Q
o(t) = Σ(t)G(t), ψo(t) = Σ(t)xo(t) + βo(t), (92)
where Σ(·), βo(·) are given by (59), (60) with si, κi, b, F, E = 0. The optimal decisions {(u1,ot , u2,ot ) :
0 ≤ t ≤ T} are obtained from (48) with σ(t, x, u) = G(t), b = 0, F = 0, E = 0, m = 0, and
they are given by
E
{
Hu1(t, x
1,o(t), x2,o(t), ψ1,o(t), ψ2,o(t), Q1,o(t), Q2,o(t), u1,ot , u
2,0
t )|G
1
0,t
}
= 0,
a.e.t ∈ [0, T ], P|G1
0,t
− a.s. (93)
E
{
Hu2(t, x
1,o(t), x2,o(t), ψ1,o(t), ψ2,o(t), Q1,o(t), Q2,o(t), u1,ot , u
2,0
t )|G
2
0,t
}
= 0,
a.e.t ∈ [0, T ], P|G2
0,t
− a.s. (94)
From (93), (94) the optimal decisions are
u
1,o
t = −R
−1
11 (t)B
(1),∗(t)E
{
ψo(t)|G10,t
}
− R−111 (t)R12(t)E
{
u
2,o
t |G
1
0,t
}
, t ∈ [0, T ]. (95)
u
2,o
t = −R
−1
22 (t)B
(2),∗(t)E
{
ψo(t)|G20,t
}
−R−122 (t)R21(t)E
{
u
1,o
t |G
2
0,t
}
. t ∈ [0, T ]. (96)
From the previous expressions we notice the following.
(O6): The optimal strategies (95), (96) illustrate the signaling between u1 and u2, which
is facilitated by the coupling in the pay-off via R(·), and the coupling in the state
dynamics of x1 and x2 via ψo(t) = Σ(t)xo(t)+βo(t). Clearly, u1,o estimates the optimal
decision of subsystem 2, u2,o, and the adjoint processes ψo from its observations, and
vice-versa. This coupling is simplified if we consider a simplified model of dynamical
coupling between subsystems x1, x2 and/or nested information structures, i.e., G20,t ⊂
G10,t. Moreover, if we consider no coupling through the pay-off, i.e., a diagonal R(·),
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then the second right hand side terms in (95), (96) will be zero, implying that the
signaling between u1,o, u2,o is done via the adjoint process ψo.
Let φ(·) be any square integrable and FT−adapted matrix-valued process or scalar-valued
processes, and define its filtered and predictor versions by
πi(φ)(t)
△
= E
{
φ(t)|Gi0,t
}
, πi(φ)(s, t)
△
= E
{
φ(s)|Gi0,t
}
, t ∈ [0, T ], s ≥ t, i = 1, 2.
For any admissible decision u and corresponding (x(·), ψ(·)) define their filter versions with
respect to Gi0,t for i = 1, 2, by
πi(x)(t)
△
=

 E
{
x1(t)|Gi0,t
}
E
{
x2(t)|Gi0,t
}

 ≡ x̂i(t), t ∈ [0, T ], i = 1, 2,
πi(ψ)(t)
△
=

 E
{
ψ1(t)|Gi0,t
}
E
{
ψ2(t)|Gi0,t
}

 ≡ ψ̂i(t), t ∈ [0, T ], i = 1, 2,
πi(u)(t)
△
=

 E
{
u1t |G
i
0,t
}
E
{
u2t |G
i
0,t
}

 ≡ ûi(t), t ∈ [0, T ], i = 1, 2,
and their predictor versions by
πi(x)(s, t)
△
=

 E
{
x1(s)|Gi0,t
}
E
{
x2(s)|Gi0,t
}

 ≡ x̂i(s, t), t ∈ [0, T ], s ≥ t, i = 1, 2,
πi(ψ)(s, t)
△
=

 E
{
ψ1(s)|Gi0,t
}
E
{
ψ2(s)|Gi0,t
}

 ≡ ψ̂i(s, t), t ∈ [0, T ], s ≥ t, i = 1, 2.
πi(u)(s, t)
△
=

 E
{
u1s|G
i
0,t
}
E
{
u2s|G
i
0,t
}

 ≡ ûi(s, t), t ∈ [0, T ], s ≥ t, i = 1, 2,
From (95), (96) the optimal decisions are
u
1,o
t ≡ −R
−1
11 (t)B
(1),∗(t)π1(ψo)(t)− R−111 (t)R12(t)E
{
u
2,o
t |G
1
0,t
}
, t ∈ [0, T ], (97)
u
2,o
t ≡ −R
−1
22 (t)B
(2),∗(t)πw
2
(ψo)(t)−R−122 (t)R21(t)E
{
u
1,o
t |G
2
0,t
}
, t ∈ [0, T ]. (98)
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The previous optimal decisions require the conditional estimates
{(π1(ψo)(t), π2(ψo)(t)) : 0 ≤ t ≤ T}. These are obtained by taking conditional expectations of
(74) giving
πi(ψo)(t) = Φ∗(T, t)M(T )πi(xo)(T, t) +
∫ T
t
Φ∗(s, t)H(s)πi(xo)(s, t)ds, t ∈ [0, T ], i = 1, 2.
(99)
Before we proceed further we shall specify the information structures available to the DMs.
Nonanticipative Information Structures. The information structure available to u1 is G10,t
△
=
σ{W 1(s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t} ≡ GW
1
0,t , and the information structure available to u2 is G20,t
△
= σ{W 2(s) :
0 ≤ s ≤ t} ≡ GW
2
0,t . Therefore, by denoting πw
i
(·)(·) the conditional expectation with respect to
GW
i
0,· , i = 1, 2, for any admissible decision, the filtered versions of x(·) based on this information
structures are given by the following stochastic differential equations [30] (Theorem 8.2).
dπw
1
(x)(t) =A(t)πw
1
(x)(t)dt+B(1)(t)u1tdt+B
(2)(t)πw
1
(u2)(t)dt
+G11(t)dW
1(t), πw
1
(x)(0) = x¯0, (100)
dπw
2
(x)(t) =A(t)πw
2
(x)(t)dt+B(2)(t)u2tdt+B
(1)(t)πw
2
(u1)(t)dt
+G22dW
2(t), πw
2
(x)(0) = x¯0. (101)
From the previous filtered versions of x(·) it is clear that subsystem 1 estimates the augmented
state vector and the actions of subsystem 2 based on its own observations, namely, πw1(u2)(·)
and subsystem 2 estimates the augmented state vector and the actions of subsystem 1 based on
its own observations, namely, πw2(u1)(·).
For any admissible decision u the predicted versions of x(·) are obtained from (100) and (101)
as follows. Utilizing the identity πwi(x)(s, t) = E
{
E
{
x(s)|GW
i
0,s
}
|GW
i
0,t
}
= E
{
πw
i
(x)(s)|GW
i
0,t
}
,
for 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T then
d
ds
πw
1
(x)(s, t) = A(s)πw
1
(x)(s, t) +B(1)(s)πw
1
(u1)(s, t) +B(2)(s)πw
1
(u2)(s, t), t < s ≤ T,
(102)
πw
1
(x)(t, t) = πw
1
(x)(t), t ∈ [0, T ), (103)
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d
ds
πw
2
(x)(s, t) = A(s)πw
2
(x)(s, t) +B(2)(s)πw
2
(u1)(s, t) +B(1)(s)πw
2
(u1)(s, t), t < s ≤ T,
(104)
πw
2
(x)(t, t) = πw
2
(x)(t), t ∈ [0, T ). (105)
Since for a given admissible policy and observation paths, {πw1(x)(s, t) : 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T} is
determined from (102) and its current value πw1(xo)(t, t) = πw1(x)(t), and {πw2(x)(s, t) : 0 ≤
t ≤ s ≤ T} is determined from (104), and its current value πw2(x)(t, t) = πw2(x)(t), then (99)
can be expressed via
πw
i
(ψo)(t) = Ki(t)πw
i
(xo)(t) + ri(t), t ∈ [0, T ], i = 1, 2. (106)
where Ki(·), ri(·) determines the operators to the one expressed via (99), for i = 1, 2. Utilizing
(106) into (97) and (98) then
u
1,o
t ≡ −R
−1
11 (t)B
(1),∗(t)
{
K1(t)πw
1
(xo)(t) + r1(t)
}
− R−111 (t)R12(t)π
w1(u2,ot )(t), t ∈ [0, T ],
(107)
u
2,o
t ≡ −R
−1
22 (t)B
(2),∗(t)
{
K2(t)πw
2
(xo)(t) + r2(t)
}
− R−122 (t)R21(t)π
w2(u1,o)(t), t ∈ [0, T ].
(108)
Let {ΨKi(t, s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T} denote the transition operator of AKi(t)
△
=
(
A(t) −
B(i)(t)R−1ii (t)B
(i),∗(t)Ki(t)
)
, for i = 1, 2.
Next, we determine Ki(·), ri(·), i = 1, 2. Substituting the previous equations into (102), (103)
and (104), (105) then
πw
1
(xo)(s, t) =ΨK1(s, t)π
w1(xo)(t)−
∫ s
t
ΨK1(s, τ)B
(1)(τ)R−111 (τ)B
(1),∗(τ)r1(τ)dτ
−
∫ s
t
ΨK1(s, τ)B
(1)(τ)R−111 (τ)R12(τ)π
w1(u2,o)(τ, t)dτ
+
∫ s
t
ΨK1(s, τ)B
(2)(τ)πw
1
(u2,o)(τ, t)dτ, t ≤ s ≤ T, (109)
πw
2
(xo)(s, t) =ΨK2(s, t)π
w2(xo)(t)−
∫ s
t
ΨK2(s, τ)B
(2)(τ)R−122 (τ)B
(2),∗(τ)r2(τ)dτ
−
∫ s
t
ΨK2(s, τ)B
(2)(τ)R−122 (τ)R21(τ)π
w2(u1,o)(τ, t)dτ
+
∫ s
t
ΨK2(s, τ)B
(1)(τ)πw
2
(u1,o)(τ, t)dτ, t ≤ s ≤ T. (110)
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Since u1,ot is GW
1
0,t −measurable and u
2,o
t is GW
2
0,t −measurable, and GW
1
0,t and GW
2
0,t are independent,
then πw1(u2,o)(τ, t) = E
(
u2τ
)
≡ u2,o(τ), πw
2
(u1,o)(τ, t) = E
(
u1τ
)
≡ u1,o(τ), 0 ≤ t ≤ τ ≤ T .
Utilizing the last observation we show in the next main theorem that the optimal DM strategies
are finite dimensional (i.e., given in terms of finite number of statistics), and that each optimal
strategy is linear function of the augmented state estimate based on his information, and the
average value of the other optimal strategy. The computation of the average optimal strategies
can be expressed in fixed point form.
Theorem 3. (Optimal decentralized strategies for LQF)
Given a LQF game the optimal decisions (u1,o, u2,o) are given
u
1,o
t ≡ −R
−1
11 (t)B
(1),∗(t)
{
K1(t)πw
1
(xo)(t) + r1(t)
}
− R−111 (t)R12(t)u
2,o(t), t ∈ [0, T ],
(111)
u
2,o
t ≡ −R
−1
22 (t)B
(2),∗(t)
{
K2(t)πw
2
(xo)(t) + r2(t)
}
− R−122 (t)R21(t)u
1,o(t), t ∈ [0, T ].
(112)
where πwi(xo)(·), i = 1, 2 satisfy the linear non-homogeneous stochastic differential equations
dπw
1
(x)(t) =A(t)πw
1
(x)(t)dt+B(1)(t)u1,ot dt+B
(2)(t)u2,o(t)dt
+G11(t)dW
1(t), πw
1
(x)(0) = x¯0, (113)
dπw
2
(x)(t) =A(t)πw
2
(x)(t)dt+B(2)(t)u2,ot dt+B
(1)(t)u1,o(t)dt
+G22dW
2(t), πw
2
(x)(0) = x¯0. (114)
and
(
Ki(·), ri(·), xo(·), ui,o(·)
)
, i = 1, 2 are solutions of the ordinary differential equations (115),
(116), (117), (118), (119), (120) below.
K˙i(t) + A∗(t)Ki(t) +Ki(t)A(t)−Ki(t)B(i)(t)R−1ii (t)B
(i),∗(t)Ki(t)
+H(t) = 0, t ∈ [0, T ), i = 1, 2, (115)
Ki(T ) = M(T ), i = 1, 2, (116)
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r˙1(t) =
{
−A∗(t) + Φ∗(T, t)M(T )ΨK1(T, t)B
(1)(t)R−111 (t)B
(1),∗(t)
+
( ∫ T
t
Φ∗(s, t)H(s)ΨK1(s, t)ds
)
B(1)(t)R−111 (t)B
(1),∗(t)
}
r1(t)
−
(∫ T
t
Φ∗(s, t)H(s)ΨK1(s, t)ds
)(
B(2)(t)− B(1)(t)R−111 (t)R12(t)
)
u2,o(t),
− Φ∗(T, t)M(T )ΨK1(T, t)
(
B(2)(t)−B(1)(t)R−111 (t)R12(t)
)
u2,o(t) t ∈ [0, T ), r1(T ) = 0,
(117)
r˙2(t) =
{
−A∗(t) + Φ∗(T, t)M(T )ΨK2(T, t)B
(2)(t)R−122 (t)B
(2),∗(t)
+
( ∫ T
t
Φ∗(s, t)H(s)ΨK2(s, t)ds
)
B(2)(t)R−122 (t)B
(2),∗(t)
}
r2(t)
−
(∫ T
t
Φ∗(s, t)H(s)ΨK2(s, t)ds
)(
B(1)(t)− B(2)(t)R−122 (t)R21(t)
)
u1,o(t)
− Φ∗(T, t)M(T )ΨK2(T, t)
(
B(1)(t)−B(2)(t)R−122 (t)R21(t)
)
u1,o(t), t ∈ [0, T ), r2(T ) = 0,
(118)
x˙o(t) = A(t)xo(t) +B(1)(t)u1,o(t) +B(2)(t)u2,o(t), xo(0) = x0, (119)

 u1,o(t)
u2,o(t)

 = −

 I R−111 (t)R12(t)
R−122 (t)R21(t) I


−1 
 R−111 (t)B(1),∗(t)
{
K1(t)xo(t) + r1(t)
}
R−122 (t)B
(2),∗(t)
{
K2(t)xo(t) + r2(t)
}

 .(120)
Proof: Since u1,ot is GW 10,t −measurable and u2,ot is GW 20,t −measurable, and GW 10,t and GW 20,t are
independent, then
πw
1
(u2)(s, t) = E
(
u2s|G
W 1
0,t
)
= E
(
u2s
)
≡ u2(s), t ≤ s ≤ T, (121)
πw
2
(u1)(s, t) = E
(
u1s|G
W 2
0,t
)
= E
(
u1s
)
≡ u1(s), t ≤ s ≤ T. (122)
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Substituting (121), (122) into (109), (110), and then (109), (110) into (99) we have
πw
1
(ψo)(t) =
{
Φ∗(T, t)M(T )ΨK1(T, t) +
∫ T
t
Φ∗(s, t)H(s)ΨK1(s, t)ds
}
πw
1
(xo)(t)
+ Φ∗(T, t)M(T )
∫ T
t
ΨK1(T, τ)
(
B(2)(τ)− B(1)(τ)R−111 (τ)R12(τ)
)
u2,o(τ)dτ
+
∫ T
t
Φ∗(s, t)H(s)
∫ s
t
ΨK1(s, τ)
(
B(2)(τ)−B(1)(τ)R−111 (τ)R12(τ)
)
u2,o(τ)dτds
− Φ∗(T, t)M(T )
∫ T
t
ΨK1(T, τ)B
(1)(τ)R−111 (τ)B
(1),∗(τ)r1(τ)dτ
−
∫ T
t
Φ∗(s, t)H(s)
∫ s
t
ΨK1(s, τ)B
(1)(τ)R−111 (τ)B
(1),∗(τ)r1(τ)dτds, (123)
πw
2
(ψo)(t) =
{
Φ∗(T, t)M(T )ΨK2(T, t) +
∫ T
t
Φ∗(s, t)H(s)ΨK2(s, t)ds
}
πw
2
(xo)(t)
+ Φ∗(T, t)M(T )
∫ T
t
ΨK2(T, τ)
(
B(1)(τ)− B(2)(τ)R−122 (τ)R21(τ)
)
u1,o(τ)dτ
+
∫ T
t
Φ∗(s, t)H(s)
∫ s
t
ΨK2(s, τ)
(
B(1)(τ)−B(2)(τ)R−122 (τ)R21(τ)
)
u1,o(τ)dτds
− Φ∗(T, t)M(T )
∫ T
t
ΨK2(T, τ)B
(2)(τ)R−122 (τ)B
(2),∗(τ)r2(τ)dτ
−
∫ T
t
Φ∗(s, t)H(s)
∫ s
t
ΨK2(s, τ)B
(2)(τ)R−122 (τ)B
(2),∗(τ)r2(τ)dτds. (124)
Comparing (106) with the previous two equations then Ki(·), i = 1, 2 are identified by the
operators
Ki(t) = Φ∗(T, t)M(T )ΨKi(T, t) +
∫ T
t
Φ∗(s, t)H(s)ΨKi(s, t)ds, t ∈ [0, T ], i = 1, 2,
(125)
and ri(·), i = 1, 2 by the processes
r1(t) =Φ∗(T, t)M(T )
∫ T
t
ΨK1(T, τ)
(
B(2)(τ)−B(1)(τ)R−111 (τ)R12(τ)
)
u2,o(τ)dτ
+
∫ T
t
Φ∗(s, t)H(s)
∫ s
t
ΨK1(s, τ)
(
B(2)(τ)− B(1)(τ)R−111 (τ)R12(τ)
)
u2,o(τ)dτds
− Φ∗(T, t)M(T )
∫ T
t
ΨK1(T, τ)B
(1)(τ)R−111 (τ)B
(1),∗(τ)r1(τ)dτ
−
∫ T
t
Φ∗(s, t)H(s)
∫ s
t
ΨK1(s, τ)B
(1)(τ)R−111 (τ)B
(1),∗(τ)r1(τ)dτds, (126)
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r2(t) =Φ∗(T, t)M(T )
∫ T
t
ΨK2(T, τ)
(
B(1)(τ)−B(2)(τ)R−122 (τ)R21(τ)
)
u1,o(τ)dτ
+
∫ T
t
Φ∗(s, t)H(s)
∫ s
t
ΨK2(s, τ)
(
B(1)(τ)− B(2)(τ)R−122 (τ)R21(τ)
)
u1,o(τ)dτds
− Φ∗(T, t)M(T )
∫ T
t
ΨK2(T, τ)B
(2)(τ)R−122 (τ)B
(2),∗(τ)r2(τ)dτ
−
∫ T
t
Φ∗(s, t)H(s)
∫ s
t
ΨK2(s, τ)B
(2)(τ)R−122 (τ)B
(2),∗(τ)r2(τ)dτds. (127)
Differentiating both sides of (125) the operators Ki(·), i = 1, 2 satisfy the following matrix
differential equations (115), (116). Differentiating both sides of (126), (127) the processes
ri(·), i = 1, 2 satisfy the differential equations (117), (118). Utilizing (121), (122) we obtain
the optimal strategies (111), (112). Next, we determine ui,o for i = 1, 2 from (111), (112).
Define the averages
x(t)
△
= E
{
x(t)
}
= E
{
πw
i
(x)(t)
}
, i = 1, 2. (128)
Then xo(·) satisfies the ordinary differential equation (119). Taking the expectation of both sides
of (111), (112) we deduce the corresponding equations
u1,o(t) = −R−111 (t)B
(1),∗(t)
{
K1(t)xo(t) + r1(t)
}
− R−111 (t)R12(t)u
2,o(t), t ∈ [0, T ], (129)
u2,o(t) = −R−122 (t)B
(2),∗(t)
{
K2(t)xo(t) + r2(t)
}
− R−122 (t)R21(t)u
1,o(t), t ∈ [0, T ]. (130)
The last two equations can be written in matrix form (120). This completes the derivation.
Hence, the optimal strategies are computed from (111), (112), where the filter equations for
πw
i
(xo)(·), i = 1, 2 satisfy (113), (114), while
(
Ki(·), ri(·), ui,o(·), xo(·)
)
, i = 1, 2 are computed
off-line utilizing the ordinary differential equations (115), (116), (117), (118), (119), (120). Note
that the optimal decentralized strategy u1,o given by (111) is a linear function of the state
x1,o(·) and E(u2,o)(·), while the state is governed by (113) corresponding to u2,o replaced by its
average value E(u2,o)(·), and similarly for u2,o. The optimal strategies can be further simplified
by considering special structures of interconnected dynamics, such as, coupling of the subsystems
via the DM’s, coupling through the pay-off only, diagonal matrices R = diag{R11, R12}, H =
diag{H11, H22},M = diag{M11,M22}, etc.
Further, Theorem 3 can be generalized to an arbitrary number of interconnected system team
games. In addition, one may consider feedback information structures, delayed information
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structures, etc..
These generalization or simplification are stated in the next remark.
Remark 4. (Generalizations and Simplifications)
Generalizations. Theorem 3 is easily generalized to the following arbitrary coupled dynamics
dxi(t) =Aii(t)x
i(t)dt+B(i)uitdt+GiidW
i(t)
+
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
Aijx
j(t)dt+
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
B(j)(t)ujtdt, x
i(0) = xi0, t ∈ (0, T ], i ∈ ZN (131)
and DM’s information structures
uit is GW
i
0,t − measurable, t ∈ [0, T ], i ∈ ZN . (132)
The optimal strategies are obvious extensions of the ones given in Theorem 3.
Simplifications. Several simpler forms can be deduced from the results of Theorem 3 by as-
suming any of the following R = diag{R11, R12}, H = diag{H11, H22},M = diag{M11,M22}.
Moreover, simplified strategies can be derived by assuming nested information structures, that
is, u1t is GW
1
0,t −measurable and u2t is G
W 1,W 2
0,t −measurable.
Delay Information Structures. The optimality conditions hold for any Gi0,t−measurable DM
strategies ui, i = 1, . . . , N . Therefore, one can apply the necessary conditions to DM’s informa-
tion structures
uit is GW
i
0,t−ǫi
− measurable, ǫi > 0, t ∈ [0, T ], i ∈ ZN . (133)
or any other information structures of interest, such as, delayed sharing.
Feedback Information Structures. The previous generalizations/simplifications also apply to
feedback information structures Gzi,u0,t . Specifically, to derive the corresponding results of The-
orem 3, even for the simplest scenario z1 = x1, z2 = x2, one has to compute conditional
expectations with respect to Gxi,u0,t , i = 1, 2, and hence one has to invoke nonlinear filter-
ing techniques to determine expressions for the filters πxi(x)(t) △= E
{
x(t)|Gx
i,u
0,t
}
, i = 1, 2,
πx
2
(u1)(t)
△
= E
{
u1t |G
x2,u
0,t
}
, πx
1
(u2)(t)
△
= E
{
u2t |G
x1,u
0,t
}
, (and predictions of x(t), u1t , u2t ). It ap-
pears to us that the optimal team laws are the same as those derived for nonanticipative
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information structures, given by (111), (112), with πwi(x)(t) replaced by πxi(x)(t), i = 1, 2 and
u1,o(t), u2,o(t) replaced by πx2(u1)(t), πx1(u2)(t). These estimates (filters) may not be described
in terms of linear Kalman-type equations driven by the DMs strategies governing the conditional
means, whose gains are specified by the conditional error covariance equations, independently
of the observations. A possible approach is to compute these conditional expectations is the
identification of a sufficient statistic as in [31]–[33].
Signaling. Given the optimal decentralized strategies of Theorem 3 we can determine the amount
of signaling among the DMs to reduce the computational complexity of the optimal strategies.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this second part of our two-part paper, we invoke the stochastic maximum principle,
conditional Hamiltonian and the coupled backward-forward stochastic differential equations
of the first part [1] to derive team optimal decentralized strategies for distributed stochastic
differential systems with noiseless information structures. We present examples of such team
games of nonlinear as well as linear quadratic forms. In some cases we obtain closed form
expressions of the optimal decentralized strategies.
The methodology is very general, and applicable to several types of information structures
such as the ones described under Remark 4. It will be interesting to consider additional types
of information structures and compute the optimal decentralized strategies in closed form, to
better understand the implications of signaling and computational complexity of such strategies
compared to centralized strategies.
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